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IS INTEREST ON TAXES DEDUCTIBLE?
— by Neil E. Harl*
For months, the debate has raged over the question of
whether interest on federal income taxes attributable to a
business is deductible for federal income tax purposes.1
Much of the debate has focused on a North Dakota farm
case2 although the Tax Court in early 1996 decided a case
on the issue.3
Background
Before enactment of a different statutory provision in
1986, interest on tax deficiencies attributable to business
income was deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense.4 However, in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Congress acted to prohibit a deduction for personal
interest (except on a phase-out basis).5 The statute
prohibiting a deduction for personal interest6 contained
several exceptions, one of which was for "interest paid or
accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or
business...."7 The conference committee report8 and the
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 19869 (the
"Blue Book") both took the position that personal interest
included interest on tax deficiencies with the Blue Book
stating specifically that interest on taxes is considered
personal interest even though the taxes may have arisen in a
trade or business.10
The temporary Regulations, issued in late 1987,11
provided that —
"...personal interest includes interest...paid on
underpayments of individual Federal, State or local
income taxes and on indebtedness used to pay such
taxes...regardless of the source of the income generating
the tax liability...."12
At that point, it appeared that interest on unpaid taxes
would not be deductible even if attributable to business
income.
Miller I
In the first case to consider the issue, Miller v. United
States,13 the U.S. District Court held the temporary
regulation invalid and allowed a deduction for $367,332 in
interest expense on the taxpayers' state and federal income
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tax returns.14 The deficiency was related to their Schedule
F. The court granted the government a 90 day continuance
to complete discovery on the issue of whether the claimed
interest deduction was "ordinary and necessary."15
Miller II
After the discovery under the granted continuance, the
government took the position that the claimed interest
deduction was not an ordinary and necessary business
expense.16 The second round of hearings produced more
facts about the nature of the transaction that produced the
deficiency. The taxpayers had established a fiscal year farm
corporation to market grain produced by the taxpayers. The
income from the grain sold after the end of the corporation's
taxable year was treated as "loans" with the income deferred
until the following year.1 7  The taxpayers, by the
government's view, had failed to report approximately $1.5
million of income on their 1982 and 1983 returns. The court
agreed that the deferral scheme was improper, stated that
the tax deficiencies were based "on a clearly erroneous
decision" by the taxpayers to underreport their income and
held that the interest failed the test of being an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense.18
That decision, Miller II, was appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit agreed that the
claimed deduction failed the "ordinary and necessary" test
but held that the temporary regulation represented "a
permissible construction" of the statute and was, therefore,
valid.19
The Tax Court decision
Although the Tax Court had decided cases on the
issue , 2 0  not until the 1996 decision of Redlark v.
Commissioner 21 did the Tax Court address the question of
validity of the temporary regulation. The Redlark case22
involved adjustments from the correction of errors in
shifting an unincorporated business from an accrual basis to
the cash basis of accounting.23
The Tax Court held that the temporary regulation
classifying all interest on back taxes as non-deductible
personal interest24 constituted "an impermissible reading of
the statute" and, therefore, was invalid.25 The Tax Court
went on to state that the interest involved in Redlark 26 was
interest "on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or
business" and was deductible. The court acknowledged that
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"there will be situations where a Federal income tax
deficiency will not be as narrowly focused" and that interest
paid on a tax deficiency may not be an ordinary and
necessary business expense.27 The court specifically noted
that Miller I and Miller II involved just such a situation.28
The Tax Court was badly divided in Redlark.29 Eight
judges agreed with the majority opinion, six dissented and
several wrote concurring opinions.
In conclusion
At the moment, for taxpayers in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals area, the regulation has been declared valid.30
Outside the Eighth Circuit, the Tax Court view prevails that
the temporary regulation is invalid but that the interest must
be an ordinary and necessary business expense to be
deductible.31
But Redlark 32 may be appealed. In any event, the last
word has probably not been written on this issue.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff's
car struck a horse on a highway. The horse belonged to the
defendant and had escaped after a parked truck rolled down
a slope and crashed through the fence holding the horse. The
evidence demonstrated that, except for the breach in the
fence caused by the truck, the fence was in good repair and
sufficient to prevent the horse from escaping. Although the
jury found for the plaintiff, the trial court entered judgment
for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict because the
evidence showed that the fence was in good repair. The
appellate court affirmed, agreeing that no evidence was
presented that the defendant or any agent, employee or
resident of the defendant was responsible for the breach in
the fence. The evidence showed that the truck was parked
on a slope in gear and with its parking brake engaged. After
the accident, the truck was out of gear and the parking brake
was off. Butcher v. White's Iowa Institute, 541 N.W.2d
262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
corporation which operated a feedlot. The corporation was
wholly-owned by the defendant who was also the president
and principal employee of the debtor. The defendant was
convicted of a check kiting scheme using the debtor's funds.
The trustee sought to recover prepetition payments made to
creditors during the check kiting as fraudulent transfers. The
trustee argued that the defendant's guilty plea in the check
kiting case was prima facie evidence that the payments to
creditors were made with intent to defraud creditors. The
court held that the guilty plea was prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud only as to the two banks used in the check
